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Abstract: Many epistemologists endorse true-belief monism, the thesis that only true beliefs 
are of fundamental epistemic value. However, this view faces formidable counterexamples. In 
response to these challenges, we alter the letter, but not the spirit, of true-belief monism. We 
dub the resulting view “inquisitive truth monism,” which holds that only true answers to 
relevant questions are of fundamental epistemic value. Which questions are relevant is a 
function of an inquirer’s perspective, which is characterized by his/her interests, social role, and 
background assumptions. Using examples of several different scientific practices, we argue that 
inquisitive truth monism outperforms true-belief monism.  
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1  Introduction 
We place a great deal of value on inquiry’s deliverances. From finding one’s keys to discovering 
the Higgs boson, our quest for knowledge and other cognitive goods is a staple of the human 
condition. For this reason, epistemologists have increasingly attended to questions of epistemic 
value.2 A central debate is whether everything that is epistemically valuable bottoms out in true 
belief’s value. Call those who take true belief as the fountainhead of all other epistemic value 
true-belief monists. 
True-belief monists are hard-pressed to account for science’s many facets. For instance, 
their narrow edifice seems ill-positioned to explain the complexity of epistemically valuable 
undertakings characterizing the scientific endeavor. If such worries are well-placed, then true-
belief monism is insufficient to account for the epistemic value animating scientific activity. 
However, we shall focus on whether true-belief monism is necessary for accounting for science’s 
epistemic goods. Several scientific practices involve idealizations (which are false), rely heavily 
on models (which are frequently, if not fundamentally, non-propositional), and traffic in public, 
intersubjective representations (and are thereby non-doxastic). For these reasons, one might 
think that either a pluralistic approach to epistemic value (Pedersen, 2017) or a monism that 
prizes a more flexible epistemic status—such as understanding (Elgin, 2017)—should supplant 
true-belief monism. 
In this paper, we have two goals. First, we will clarify science’s challenges to true-belief 
monism’s claim to provide necessary conditions on epistemic value. Second, we will argue that 
while the letter of true-belief monism is not defensible, a near-neighbor that retains its spirit is. 
To that end, Section 2 offers a more precise definition of true-belief monism. Section 3 presents 
our successor position, inquisitive truth monism, according to which epistemic value’s ultimate 
bearers are true answers to relevant questions. Sections 4 and 5 then show how inquisitive truth 
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monism outperforms true-belief monism in accounting for science’s epistemically valuable 
facets. Finally, one of our boldest departures from true-belief monism is our reliance on 
perspectives to determine which questions are relevant to a given inquirer. For this reason, 
Section 6 defends our perspectivism against several potential objections. 
 
2  True-Belief Monism 
To set the stage, we define true-belief monism as follows: 
 
True-Belief Monism (TBM): For all 𝑥, 𝑥 is epistemically valuable only if:   
1.  𝑥 is a true belief, or  
2.  𝑥 is a means to acquiring true beliefs, or  
3.  𝑥’s epistemically valuable components are either true beliefs or a means to 
acquiring true beliefs.3  
  
True-belief monists include Ahlstrom-Vij (2013), David (2001), Goldman (1999), Olsson (2007), 
and Sosa (2003). Sometimes, this doctrine is put in terms of true belief being the only 
“fundamental epistemic value" (Ahlstrom-Vij & Grimm 2013). So far as we can tell, TBM’s three 
conditions capture this sense of fundamentality. 
Corresponding to these conditions are three strategies for true-belief monists to account 
for epistemically valuable states of affairs. First, per TBM1, whenever something is deemed 
epistemically valuable because it is a true belief, we will call this the basic TBM strategy. 
Second, whenever true-belief monists account for something’s epistemic value by way of 
TBM2, we will call this TBM’s instrumental strategy.4  In general, a state of affairs 𝑥  is of 
instrumental epistemic value if it is a means to some other epistemically valuable state of affairs 𝑦. It is of mere instrumental epistemic value if this exhuasts its epistemic value. True-belief 
monists hold that anything of mere instrumental epistemic value must ultimately be a means to 
acquiring true beliefs. Paradigmatically, many true-belief monists take justification to be of mere 
instrumental epistemic value. 
Finally, per TBM3, certain epistemic statuses might have derivative epistemic value 
because their components submit to the basic and instrumental TBM strategies. Call the 
employment of this claim TBM’s componential strategy. For instance, true-belief monists might 
argue that knowledge is of non-fundamental epistemic value because its only non-instrumental 
epistemic value is true belief, and its remaining components (e.g., justification, Gettier-
resistance) are of mere instrumental epistemic value, i.e. are epistemically valuable only insofar 
as they are an effective means for acquiring true beliefs. Of course, this isn’t the only way that 
TBM can account for knowledge’s epistemic value; we use it simply for purposes of illustration. 
 
3  Inquisitive Truth Monism 
As already mentioned, we have sympathies with true-belief monism, but prefer a kindred 
position. To motivate this alternative, consider a metaepistemological question: What counts as 
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evidence when adjudicating between competing accounts of epistemic value? Unlike more 
venerable philosophical topics, e.g. knowledge, truth, goodness, beauty, etc., the term 
“epistemic value" does not appear in ordinary talk, and our folkways do not make hard and fast 
distinctions between epistemic and other kinds of value. So, it’s unclear which intuitions, 
practices, etc. matter when claiming that something is or is not epistemically valuable. This makes 
it too convenient to discard hard cases as lacking in epistemic value (e.g., as merely pragmatic.) 
Furthermore, like many human endeavors, links of causation and covariance are noisy and 
underdetermined by armchair observations. Consequently, it is too easy to provide just-so stories 
about how something could be a means to one’s favored epistemic good. 
Combined, these metaepistemological worries paint an unflattering portrait of 
discussions concerning epistemic value. For instance, true-belief monists can run their three 
strategies in fairly unconstrained, ad hoc ways, and then discard the remaining cases as non-
epistemic on fairly unprincipled grounds. Fortunately, epistemic value theorists in general, and 
true-belief monists in particular, broadly agree on one pre-theoretic consideration that fixes the 
reference of “epistemic value" (Ahlstrom-Vij 2013; Lynch 2004; Sosa 2003). Ahlstrom-Vij & 
Grimm (2013, 330) nicely summarize this idea:  
 
…epistemic value is a function of the goals of inquiry, where ‘inquiry’ refers to the 
range of inquisitive practices concerned with the posing and answering of 
questions… the goals of inquiry determine which activities, states, processes, 
practices, and so on are epistemically valuable. 
 
 In other words, the foremost “theory-neutral" way of determining whether something 
is epistemically valuable appeals to the goals underlying practices of asking and answering 
questions. Call this the Intuition About Inquiry. We will recruit this platitude to adjudicate 
between competing accounts of fundamental epistemic value via three interventions. 
First, the Intuition About Inquiry suggests that closer attention to the semantics and 
pragmatics of questions and answers (Belnap & Steel 1976, Groenendijk & Stokhof 1984, Hamblin 
1958, Millson 2014, Wiśniewski 1995) mitigates the aforementioend metaepistemological worry. 
This research clarifies these inquisitive practices, and thereby promises to also clarify what is of 
epistemic value. Space being limited, we can only hint at the possibilities of this here. For present 
purposes, we adopt what is known as the ‘set-of-answers’ methodology in the logic of questions 
and answers, i.e. erotetic logic (Wiśniewski 2013). Following this approach, we treat 
interrogatives’ content as the set of their possible answers. We take possible answers to be 
propositions and thus conceive of questions as sets of propositions. This allows us to import 
various relations among questions and statements studied by Inferential Erotetic Logic (IEL) 
(Wiśniewski 1995, 2013); most importantly, that of erotetic implication (see below). For this 
essay’s purposes, ‘answer’ is shorthand for ‘possible answer.’ We rest on readers’ intuitions 
about what counts as a possible answer to a question. 
Second, the Intuition About Inquiry suggests that examining scientific inquiries—where 
inquirers are especially explicit about the questions they are asking and how they are coming to 
their answers—will further mitigate our metaepistemological worry. Sections 4 and 5 embrace 
this suggestion in full. Of course, scientific inquiries are not the only inquiries worth consulting. 
Rather, we merely suggest that scientific inquiries are especially useful in adjudicating between 
competing accounts of epistemic value. 
Third, and most importantly, the Intuition About Inquiry hints at an alternative to TBM. It 
is a platitude that the goal of asking a question is answering it correctly. This suggests the 
following: 
Inquisitive Truth Monism (ITM): For all 𝑥, 𝑥 is epistemic valuable only if:   
    1.  𝑥 is a true answer to a relevant question, or  
    2.  𝑥 is a means to acquiring true answers to relevant questions, or  
    3.  𝑥’s epistemically valuable components are either true answers to relevant 
questions or a means to acquiring true answers to relevant questions.  
  
Like TBM, ITM admits of basic, instrumental, and componential strategies and prizes truth. 
However, TBM valorizes true beliefs, while ITM valorizes true answers to relevant questions. As 
we shall argue below, belief is often ancillary to scientific inquiry. Conversely, true beliefs that 
answer no relevant questions fail to fulfill scientific inquiry’s goals. As such, ITM enjoys certain 
explanatory advantages over TBM. 
According to our brand of ITM, perspectives determine whether a question is relevant or 
not. Perspectives are combinations of an agent’s personal interests, social roles, and background 
assumptions.5 We discuss each in turn. First, questions may be relevant because of inquirers’ 
personal interests.6 Interests in questions’ answers may serve some practical end, e.g. “Where 
is the rake?" Other questions might be sparked by interests that are less practical, e.g. mere 
curiosity. 
Second, questions may be relevant because inquirers have role-responsibilities to answer 
them.7 Here, we adopt Hart’s (1968, 212) account of role-responsibilities: 
 
…whenever a person occupies a distinctive place or office in a social organization, 
to which specific duties are attached to provide for the welfare of others or to 
advance in some specific way the aims or purposes of the organization, he is 
properly said to be responsible for the performance of these duties, or for 
performing what is necessary to fulfill them.  
 
 As a simple illustration, John would be within his rights to ask his mechanic, Jane, why 
his car screeches when he makes left turns. Furthermore, Jane would be failing to fulfill her 
professional responsibilities if she refused to explain this to John. As such, her role-responsibility 
includes answering the question, “Why does John’s car screech whenever he turns left?" The 
question is thereby relevant to Jane, even if she is not interested in the answer. 
Finally, questions may be relevant in a ‘derivative’ sense, so to speak. For instance, 
suppose that the following question is relevant: “Is every member of the Edinburgh philosophy 
faculty Scottish?" Then each of the following questions are also relevant: “Is Michela Massimi 
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Scottish?," “Is Nick Treanor Scottish?," etc. In IEL’s parlance, the first “superquestion" erotetically 
implies the other “subquestions." So, relevant superquestions can “transmit" their relevance to 
subquestions via erotetic implication. Much like role-responsibilities, erotetic implications place 
inquirers on the hook for questions that they might not be interested in answering—or even 
aware of. 
Importantly, erotetic implication can be far more sophisticted than the example above 
suggests. Erotetic implication frequently behaves nonmonotonically, which pairs naturally with 
it being sensitive to an inquirer’s background assumptions (Millson 2019). For instance, suppose 
“Where is the rake?" is a relevant question and that the speaker remembers that her partner 
tends to leave the rake outside when in a rush. This question then erotetically implies the 
subquestion, “Was my partner in a rush?" Since the background assumptions include the 
speaker’s memories, the inference can be overturned if it turns out that the speaker’s memory 
is unreliable. Importantly, we do not assume that background assumptions need to be true in 
order to generate relevant questions. We defend this position in Section 6. 
To summarize thus far, we are proposing ITM in lieu of TBM. Its major difference is in 
replacing true beliefs with true answers to relevant questions as epistemic value’s locus. We are 
perspectivists about questions’ relevance, where agents’ perspectives include interests, social 
roles, and background assumptions. A question is relevant to an inquirer if she is interested in its 
answer, has a role-responsibility to answer it, or it is a subquestion that is erotetically implied by 
a superquestion (and her background assumptions) that is already relevant because of these 
interests and role-responsibilities. Thus, ITM implies that whether or not a truth is epistemically 
valuable depends on one’s perspective. 
 
4  Characterizing Inquiry’s Goals 
  We begin by arguing that inquisitive truth monism (ITM) better describes scientific 
inquiry’s goals than true-belief monism (TBM). This argument rests on two claims.8 First, true 
beliefs that fail to answer relevant questions are not among inquiry’s goals. Second, some true 
answers to relevant questions need not be believed in order to serve as these goals. 
Consequently, ITM more faithfully describes inquiry’s goals than does TBM. 
Begin with the first claim. According to the Intuition About Inquiry, we should consult our 
practices of asking and answering questions to determine what is epistemically valuable. True 
beliefs that answer no relevant questions seem to clash with this intuition and common sense, 
for belief in any true non sequitur would thereby function as a goal of inquiry. For instance, 
suppose that someone’s only true belief about the ideal gas law is that Clapeyron first formulated 
it in 1834, but she seeks to answer the question, “Why does the ideal gas law hold at low pressure 
and high temperature?" Clearly, she has not met this inquiry’s goal despite having a true belief. 
Hence, absent ITM’s constraints, TBM fails to characterize inquiry’s goals. Moreover, note that 
the concept of relevance is precisely what is perspectival about ITM. Hence, ITM’s perspectivism 
makes all the difference in its superior coverage of inquiry’s goals. 
Turn now to the second claim: that having a true answer to a relevant question without 
believing it can sometimes result in a successful inquiry. TBM denies that such inquiries are 
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successful, while ITM strongly suggests that they are.9 However, some other cognitive attitudes 
toward a true answer appear to do just as well as belief in properly settling a scientific inquiry. 
ITM suggests that scientists who rightly believe an answer have nothing more epistemically 
valuable than scientists who, e.g., merely accept it. Here, we follow Cohen (1992) in defining 
acceptance as the adopting of a policy of including a claim as a premise in deciding what to do or 
think within a given context, where (as we see it) the most important things to “do or think" 
involve answering the relevant questions. While we focus on acceptance, there is no reason these 
points could not be extended to other attitudes. For instance, Buchak (2014) argues that 
credences are distinct from beliefs. If arguments such as hers are sound, then our remarks about 
acceptance carry over to credence. More generally, we might think of ‘having’ true answers to 
relevant questions as mulitply realized by different kinds of mental states. 
Leaving room for acceptance without belief accords well with scientific practice. Some 
notable scientists, including Ernst Mach, Karl Pearson, the young Einstein, Niels Bohr, and Milton 
Friedman, did not appear to believe some of their most notable scientific discoveries, but can 
plausibly be interpreted as accepting those results. Indeed, some have suggested that scientific 
inquiry typically involves acceptance rather than belief (Kukla 2015). By contrast, TBM 
implausibly implies that scientists who accept without believing answers possess nothing of 
epistemic value. 
Importantly, our discussion of acceptance is just the tip of the iceberg: ITM is even more 
inclusive about the vehicle by which a true answer is delivered! Many scientific representations 
are public and intersubjective. Hence, they are not individual mental states. While this claim 
seems intuitive, it gains further traction when we consider that aside from recognition and 
esteem, scientific innovators have little in the way of property rights with respect to their 
discoveries (Merton 1973 [1942]). Similarly, paradigmatic uses of the term ‘scientific knowledge’ 
frequently refer to epistemic statuses that do not supervene on individual mental states (Bird 
2010, Magnus 2013). Thus, if beliefs are individual mental states, then scientific inquiry 
frequently aims for something else. 
In other words, scientific representations may be of a more public flavor than TBM would 
allow. Non-mental representations (such as declarative sentences) or speech-acts that need not 
express belief (such as public announcements) can also express answers to relevant questions, 
and our view takes them to be just as epistemically worthwhile as true beliefs. These different 
vehicles—sentences, public announcements, collective acceptance, and other kinds of “public 
answers”—show that answers to relevant questions need not wear the cloak of belief. Thus, 
unlike TBM, ITM has no difficulty in accommodating inquiries that have these intersubjective 
representations as their goal. 
Taking stock, having true answers to relevant questions without belief can sometimes 
result in successful inquiry. Answers can be accepted without being believed, or can be public 
representations without expressing beliefs. Furthermore, the vehicle by which true answers are 
delivered is naturally thought to depend on one’s interests and social roles, i.e. one’s perspective. 
Hence, perspectivism once again is ITM’s lynchpin. 
Yet, true-belief monists may resist our arguments about public answers in at least three 
ways. We anticipate and rebut these objections in what follows. First, true-belief monists may 
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counter that, at root, scientists aim to have true beliefs, and that public answers are merely 
pragmatic side-effects of this true belief. Let attitudinal ecumenicalism denote ITM’s ability to 
accommodate both doxastic and non-doxastic attitudes as goals of inquiry. Then this defense of 
TBM merely presupposes the falsity of attitudinal ecumenicalism without argument; it does not 
preclude the possibility that scientists sometimes aim to accept true answers. So, even if public 
answers are mere side-effects, it is not clear that they are mere side-effects of beliefs. Moreover, 
on this defense, TBM concedes that beliefs are causally efficacious in producing public answers. 
However, they then need to fend off an alternative interpretation: beliefs are a mere means to 
public answers. For instance, providing an answer as a public representation (e.g. a declarative 
sentence) frequently requires belief simply because one’s role-responsibilities require sincere 
communication. In such inquiries, belief’s value might be exhausted by this sincerity 
requirement. 
Second, TBM’s adherents may claim that inquiry sometimes aim at collective beliefs, and 
public answers ought to be collectively believed. After all, TBM says nothing about whether 
beliefs are restricted to individuals. However, this once again fails to counter attitudinal 
ecumenicalism, for belief is not the only attitude amenable to collectivization: collective 
acceptance, collective credence, etc. may sometimes serve as the aim of inquiry. Indeed, some 
compelling arguments suggest that collective acceptance is more apt to ascribe to groups than is 
collective belief (Wray 2001). Clearly, such arguments dovetail with our previous remarks. 
Finally, TBM’s defenders may treat public answers as a means to getting many inquirers 
to have true beliefs. Yet again, this does not address attitudinal ecumenicalism. In other words, 
purveyors of this defense owe some explanation for why public answers are a means to beliefs 
rather than to any number of other cognitive attitudes one may adopt towards true answers to 
relevant questions. Moreover, it suggests that scientists who had true but unpopular answers 
during their time—e.g. Nicolas Copernicus, Ignaz Semmelweis, and Rosalind Franklin—only 
succeeded in their inquiries when their respective scientific communities came around. By 
contrast, ITM more plausibly suggests that they succeeded when they correctly answered their 
inquiries’ main questions, regardless of how slow their peers’ uptake may have been.10 
To summarize, true beliefs that fail to answer relevant questions are not goals of inquiry, 
since they would allow non sequiturs to serve as such goals. Conversely, some true answers to 
relevant questions—including accepted and public answers—need not be believed in order to 
serve as these goals. Consequently, ITM more faithfully describes inquiry’s goals than does TBM. 
 
5  Scientific Practice 
True-belief monism (TBM) and inquisitive truth monism (ITM) differ in subtle ways. In the 
prevailing literature on epistemic value, differences such as these are typically adjudicated by 
comparing competing views’ accordance with relatively mundane epistemic practices, 
sometimes spruced up through the art of thought experiment. However, we shall take a different 
tack, as many of TBM’s shortcomings accrue greater nuance when it is required to account for 
the epistemic value implicit in scientific practice. In what follows, we present three of these 
challenges—all concerning whether TBM imposes licit necessary conditions on epistemic value—
and show that TBM succeeds where its forebear fails. 
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5.1  Non-Propositional Representations 
  Both TBM and ITM require epistemic value’s locus to be propositionally structured. By 
contrast, the vehicles of scientific representation are theories, models, diagrams, and so forth. 
None of these representations are naturally glossed as propositions. As we saw, TBM has three 
ways of accounting for epistemic value. We shall now argue that the basic and componential TBM 
strategies fail to account for scientific representations’ epistemic value, and that TBM’s 
instrumental strategy is less plausible than its ITM counterpart. Moreover, ITM’s greater 
plausibility in this context is an instance of a broader argumentative strategy. 
Begin with TBM’s basic strategy, which holds that these sundry scientific representations 
are in fact true beliefs. As mentioned above, scientific representations are frequently non-
propositional. On the leading accounts, scientific representations are models. For those of a more 
structuralist bent, models are set-theoretic structures (van Fraassen 2008). Such structures are 
neither true nor false, and, for this reason, are not propositional. However, even non-structuralist 
accounts of scientific representation renounce the idea that models must be propositional (Giere 
2006, 64–65; Suárez 2012, 216–217; Weisberg 2013, 22). 
TBM’s componential strategy looks equally unpromising, for true beliefs are not 
components of scientific representations. Indeed, in the scientific inquiries that do result in 
belief, the exact opposite is true: scientific representations are the epistemically valuable 
components of the relevant beliefs. Since scientific models frequently lack propositional 
structure, one cannot simply ‘believe a model.’ Rather, one must believe that a model is, e.g., 
accurate. However, this implies that models are contents—'components,’ so to speak—of their 
attendant beliefs. Parallel points apply to other scientific representations, such as theories and 
measurements. 
While TBM’s basic and componential strategies are nonstarters, its instrumental strategy 
contains a grain of truth. On this line, such representations are not goals of inquiry unto 
themselves. Rather, they are a means to acquiring true beliefs.11 We agree that, insofar as 
scientific representations are non-propositional, they are merely a means to fulfilling inquiry’s 
goals. However, our instrumental strategy suggests that representations are not a means to 
acquiring true beliefs, but a means to providing true answers to relevant questions. For instance, 
x-rays are a means to answering the question, “Is the patient’s bone broken?" In a similar vein, 
statistical mechanics is a means to answering questions such as, “How do ions, atoms, and 
molecules vibrate within crystals?," “How do intermolecular forces affect the thermodynamics 
of gases?" and so on. 
We can clarify ITM’s instrumental strategy. Even when construed non-propositionally, 
scientific representations are widely thought to support “surrogative inference;” very roughly, 
competent and informed users can take propositions about the representational source as 
premises and draw valid conclusions about the target (Suárez 2002). Surrogative inferences are 
sound when their conclusions are true. Thus, a scientific representation, A, of a target, B, is 
epistemically valuable in context C just in case the sound surrogative inferences from A to B have 
conclusions that correctly answer every relevant question in C. In this way, ITM’s instrumental 
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strategy accommodates non-propositional representations. Moreover, Sections 5.2 and 5.3 show 
that questions’ relevance—and, by implication, ITM’s perspectivism—is crucial in accounting for 
different modeling practices’ epistemic value. 
We think that ITM’s instrumental strategy is more plausible than TBM’s. Section 4 
provides a simple explanation: precisely because ITM better characterizes inquiry’s goals than 
TBM does, ITM’s instrumental strategy will outperform its TBM counterpart (ceteris paribus). 
Specifically, TBM’s instrumental strategy counsels scientists to pursue the most effective means 
to acquiring true beliefs, regardless of whether those true beliefs answer any relevant questions. 
Thus, just as non sequiturs were problems for TBM in Section 4, non-propositional 
representations that are a means to these non sequiturs will pose problems for TBM’s 
instrumental strategy in this discussion. Similarly, just as true answers that were accepted or 
publicly implemented posed problems for TBM above, non-propositional representations that 
yield true answers to relevant questions but are ‘merely’ accepted or publicly implemented will 
be denied the epistemic value that they deserve. Nor are these problems peculiar to non-
propositional representations: they will arise in any case where ITM’s strategy is (ceteris paribus) 
the same as TBM’s. Whenever this arises, we’ll call it ITM’s axiological advantage.12 
To summarize, science provides some of our most exemplary kinds of inquiries. 
Frequently, these inquiries attain their goal by hitting upon accurate representations—theories, 
models, and the like—that are not propositions. According to ITM, such representations are a 
means to answering relevant questions, and are thereby of instrumental epistemic value. By 
contrast, TBM does not readily account for these representations’ epistemic value. Hence, only 
ITM accords with these aspects of scientific practice. 
 
5.2  Idealizations 
Critics frequently point to idealizations as evidence against TBM. In short, idealizations appear to 
be epistemically valuable falsehoods, and this is thought to be incompatible with TBM. Once 
again, TBM’s basic and componential strategies are unpromising, and its instrumental strategy 
succumbs to ITM’s axiological advantage. 
Begin with a shopworn example. The ideal gas law is:  
 
 𝑝𝑉% = 𝑅𝑇  
 
Here, 𝑝, 𝑉%, and 𝑇 denote a gas’ pressure, molar volume, and temperature, respectively, and 𝑅 is the ideal gas constant. In some statistical-mechanical derivations of this law, particles in a 
gas are assumed not to interact. 13  Though false, this assumption appears to advance our 
understanding of gases. 
Such understanding is epistemically valuable, yet TBM does not readily accommodate it. 
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models assume that particles interact; others do not. See Doyle et al. (in press) for a discussion. 
Quite clearly, the basic TBM strategy will not work, because the proposition that particles in an 
ideal gas do not interact is false and (consequently) acceptance rather than belief appears to be 
a more appropriate attitude toward such a proposition (Elgin 2017, Doyle et al. in press). Of 
course, this also means that true beliefs are not components of the idealization (or the attitude 
thereof), so the componential strategy also fails. 
TBM’s instrumental strategy suggests that idealizations are a means to acquiring true 
beliefs.14 For example, assuming non-interacting particles makes the ideal gas law’s underlying 
statistical mechanics more salient. As before, this contains a grain of truth that is better 
articulated by ITM’s instrumental strategy, which, when applied to idealizations, recapitulates 
ITM’s axiological advantage. So, for the reasons discussed above, idealizations are better 
regarded as a means to answering relevant questions than populating scientists’ heads with true 
beliefs. 
Additionally, true-belief monists who assign mere instrumental epistemic value to 
idealizations must address two crucial issues that ITM ably resolves. First, are idealizations 
epistemically benign, i.e. of no epistemic value, or are they epistemically harmful, i.e. of negative 
epistemic value owing to their falsehood? Second, if idealizations are epistemically harmful, then 
what kind of principled “axiological book-keeping" assures true-belief monists that idealizations’ 
positive epistemic value outweighs their negative epistemic value?15 
Shifting from TBM to ITM fills these gaps. Begin by distinguishing epistemically benign and 
epistemically harmful falsehoods. Our view suggests that epistemically benign falsehoods are 
false answers to irrelevant questions. This does justice to the assumption of non-interacting 
particles in deriving the ideal gas law. Consider the central question in this example—why does 
the ideal gas law hold? As several authors note, whether particles interact is no part of the answer 
to this question (Doyle et al. in press; Strevens 2008; Khalifa 2017; Sullivan & Khalifa 2019). 
Rather, the partition function—which is true—does the lion’s share of the work.16 So, in many 
contexts in which this why-question is relevant, an irrelevant question would be, “Do particles in 
an ideal gas interact?" Thus, the assumption of non-interacting particles is epistemically benign 
because the only false answers it yields are to irrelevant questions such as this one. 
We can contrast this with epistemically harmful falsehoods, which have negative 
epistemic value because they are false answers to relevant questions. Continuing with our 
example, a false answer to the question of why the ideal gas law obtains, for instance, would be 
epistemically harmful. Indeed, cases in which questions about particle interactions become 
relevant are readily available. For instance, a slightly more sophisticated equation of state than 
the ideal gas law is the van der Waals equation: 
 
 (𝑝 + 𝑎/𝑉%-)(𝑉% − 𝑏) = 𝑅𝑇 
 
Here, 𝑎 and 𝑏 represent intermolecular attraction and molecular volume, respectively. 
                                                     
14 Doyle et al. (in press) argue this point. 
15 NB: Some deny that idealizations have any epistemic value, but are replete with non-epistemic benefits, such as easier calculation (e.g., 
Sullivan & Khalifa 2019). Such views face similar challenges, for they may need to keep axiological books on whether idealizations’ positive non-
epistemic value eclipses their negative epistemic value. Our arguments against TBM’s instrumental strategy apply, with minor revision, to these 
positions. 
16 A staple of statistical mechanics, the partition function 𝑍 is given by a sum over all states of the system in terms of the energy 𝐸 of each 
state: 𝑍 = Σ𝑒56/78. 
Importantly, 𝑎 ≠ 0. Thus, whereas a false answer to the question, “Do particles in this gas 
interact?" makes no difference to answering why the ideal gas law obtains, the same cannot be 
said when answering why the van der Waals equation holds. In short, the latter question 
erotetically implies the question about particle interactions. Thus, in the case of the van der 
Waals equation, the falsehood that particles do not interact is epistemically harmful. 
We have seen that ITM fruitfully distinguishes between epistemically benign and 
epistemically harmful falsehoods. It thereby obviates any “axiological book-keeping.” Since the 
idealization involved in the ideal gas law is epistemically benign, whatever positive value it 
possesses can shine through at no epistemic cost. Moreover, this once again rests on which 
questions are relevant. Hence, it provides another advertisement for ITM’s perspectivism. 
Could TBM pull off an analogous move? On such a view, epistemically benign falsehoods 
are not believed (but are perhaps accepted), while epistemically harmful falsehoods are believed. 
However, this TBM proposal looks deeply flawed. Consider two scenarios that are identical, save 
for the following:   
  
False Belief: Jack believes a false answer to a relevant question, say that little demons’ 
machinations are why the ideal gas law obtains.  
 
False Acceptance: Jack accepts, but does not believe, the same false answer to the same 
relevant question.  
 
 If this TBM proposal is correct, then False Belief is epistemically harmful but False 
Acceptance is benign. However, this just seems wrong. By contrast, ITM delivers the more 
plausible verdict: both situations are epistemically harmful, as both provide false answers to 
relevant questions. Furthermore, because they cannot satisfactorily distinguish between 
epistemically benign and epistemically harmful falsehoods, true-belief monists must still balance 
their axiological books. 
To summarize, we have argued that TBM’s advocates are right to think that idealizations 
are of mere instrumental epistemic value, but are wrong to think that true beliefs ground this 
epistemic value. Any account that takes idealizations to be of instrumental epistemic value must 
distinguish between epistemically benign and epistemically harmful falsehoods. Our way of 
funding this distinction outdoes TBM’s. Hence, idealizations are more profitably understood as 
an effective means to answering relevant questions—as determined by inquirers’ perspectives. 
 
5.3 Approximations 
  Idealizations vividly illustrate TBM’s poor fit with one of model-based science’s 
representational tropes. Might TBM fare better with more mundane tropes of these kinds? 
Specifically, idealizations are deliberate distortions, but even the most accurate scientific 
representations are approximations. As we shall now show, ITM better explains approximations’ 
epistemic value. 
In approximations, something is close to the truth, but not perfectly accurate. For 
example, in using the ideal gas law, scientists appear to answer questions such as: 
  
Q1.  How much will doubling pressure affect temperature?  
  
Their answer is:  
 
A1.  Doubling pressure will double temperature. 
 
Precisely because the ideal gas law does not countenance particle interactions, this answer is 
only approximately true. However, all such approximations are, strictly speaking, false. 
Furthermore, because A1 is false, approximations would appear to pose problems for both TBM 
and ITM. Indeed, for reasons analogous to those discussed with idealizations, no simple 
application of the basic and componential TBM/ITM strategies will work, since there simply are 
no truths expressed by approximations. 
Nevertheless, the basic ITM strategy is not doomed. By highlighting the role that 
background assumptions play in determining speakers’ questions (and hence the range of 
possible answers), we can recover true answers from strictly false statements. For instance, 
scientists know that the ideal gas law is an approximation that only works at low pressure and 
high temperature. These standards of approximation are part of the implicit common knowledge 
operative in most scientific contexts. Thus, competent and informed audiences will interpret Q1 
as shorthand for the following, more explicit question: 
  
Q2.  At low density and high temperature, how much will doubling pressure affect 
temperature within an acceptable margin for error (𝜀)?  
 
Similarly, such audiences will interpret A1 as expressing:   
 
A2.  At low density and high temperature, doubling pressure will double temperature 
within an acceptable margin for error (𝜀). 
  
Crucially, A2 is not merely approximately true, but strictly true. Thus, whether a putative 
approximation is epistemically valuable depends on the phenomena being studied and the 
purposes to which it is being requisitioned. Questions about the phenomena nicely capture these 
dimensions of approximation, and can thereby do justice to approximations’ shifting fortunes 
regarding epistemic value. 
By contrast, TBM has no such mechanism. To see this, note that both the ideal gas law 
and the van der Waals equation can be regarded as approximations of the state of affairs more 
accurately represented by the virial equation of state: 
 
 <=>?8 = 1 + A=> + B=>C + D=>E + ⋯ 
  
This expansion is rendered arbitrarily precise by extending the equation indefinitely, with each 
added term being derivable from increasingly detailed and accurate assumptions about the 
intermolecular forces. For instance, 𝐵 corresponds to interactions between pairs of molecules; 𝐶, triplets; 𝐷, quartets; etc. Every non-virial equation of state, such as the ideal gas law and the 
van der Waals equation, is approximately true under different boundary conditions, and is, 
strictly speaking, false. 
TBM may attempt to accommodate these and other approximations by mimicking our 
strategy. Such mimickry would distinguish between: (a) the true claim that approximately, p and 
(b) the false but approximately true claim that p. Since it builds the approximation into the 
content of the proposition, so to speak, the former is true and not merely approximately so. 
Hence, just as ITM would allow (a) to serve as an answer, TBM would allow it to serve as a belief. 
In this example, 𝑝𝑉% = 𝑅𝑇 is false, but a nearby claim is true, and not merely approximately so. 
Perhaps what is believed is the truth that, at low pressure and high temperature, 𝑝𝑉% ≈ 𝑅𝑇 
(Mizrahi 2012). This suffices as far as it goes, but, once again, ITM explains approximations’ 
epistemic value better than TBM. 
For instance, the ideal gas law (or van der Waals equation, for that matter) is simply not 
epistemically valuable when it comes to the purposes that other equations of state serve. 
Consider the stiffened equation of state, 17  which has many applications, e.g., modeling 
underwater nuclear explosions. Additionally, it has practical applications such as sonic shock 
lithrotripsy—a treatment for kidney stones and other ailments. Since all equations of state are 
approximations of the virial expansion, a TBM strategy that simply swapped out “=" for “≈" fails 
to explain why the ideal gas law is not epistemically valuable in modeling these phenomena. By 
contrast, ITM has no such problem: only the stiffened equation of state correctly answers 
questions about underwater nukes, kidney stones, and other delights. 
Moreover, this case is not isolated. Dozens of equations of state exist, and figure in the 
modeling of explosives, seawater salinity, stars, the products of particle interactions, oilfield 
reservoirs, and so on. Each phenomenon is the object of a distinct line of inquiry with its own set 
of questions and concomitant background assumptions. Thus, ITM is superior to TBM in 
accounting for why different approximations are epistemically valuable in different 
circumstances, and precisely because of its perspectivism. Additionally, and as before, equations 
of state earn their keep by being answers to questions, and how they are implemented in 
scientists’ minds is secondary—yet another manifestation of ITM’s axiological advantage. 
However, perhaps TBM’s instrumental strategy provides a reprieve. This would mean 
that, e.g., accepting the ideal gas law is valuable simply because it is a means to achieving a true 
belief. This will also succumb to the axiological advantage, but even if we bracket that point, there 
is a further question: to which truths are equations of state a means? As we see it, the two most 
plausible options fail to redeem TBM. 
The first option is that non-virial equations of state are each a means to the virial 
expansion; to use Elgin’s (2007, 41) apt turn of phrase, they’re mere “way stations" to something 
more accurate. However, this gets scientific practice backwards: much of scientific discovery in 
this area uses the virial expansion to discover new equations of state that model more specific 
phenomena. The ideal gas law’s historical peculiarity and simplicity obscure this fact. By contrast, 
the stiffened equation of state is more representative: it was discovered by conjoining the virial 
expansion with assumptions about highly pressurized water’s physical properties and then 
performing the appropriate derivations. Thus, the stiffened equation of state is not plausibly 
regarded as a means to discovering the virial expansion, since this gets the order of discovery and 
                                                     
17 The stiffened equation of state is: 𝑝 = 𝜌(𝛾 − 1)𝑒 − 𝛾𝑝M. Here, 𝜌 is the water’s density, 𝑒 is the internal energy per unit mass, 𝛾 is an 
empirically determined constant (≈ 6.1), and 𝑝M is another constant, representing the attraction between water molecules. 
derivation backwards. Indeed, this suggests that the virial expansion is a means to answering 
questions about the stiffened equation of state (though not merely so). 
On the second way of glossing TBM’s instrumental strategy, the ideal gas law is a means 
to acquiring true beliefs about changes in particular gases’ pressure, volume, temperature, etc. 
for gases at low pressure and high temperature. For this to work, the propositions about changes 
in a gas’ properties would have to be true, and could not be mere approximations. Otherwise, 
they simply reignite the fires they were supposed to extinguish. However, this is implausible. If 
pressure approximately increases by a given magnitude, then one cannot infer that temperature 
increases exactly by a proportional magnitude. Of course, true-belief monists could avoid this 
result by hedging these claims using “≈" instead of “=", but we have already rehearsed ITM’s 
advantages on this front. 
Thus, like idealizations, ITM surpasses TBM against the problems posed by scientists’ 
ample use of approximations. Specifically, it more precisely indicates when a particular 
approximation is epistemically valuable. Unlike our previous discussions, however, 
approximations are not of mere instrumental epistemic value; they can serve as goals of inquiry 
unto themselves. This is as it should be: many answers to scientific questions traffic in 
approximations. 
 
6 Perspectivism Defended 
Summarizing, inquisitive truth monism surpasses true-belief monism in better characterizing 
both scientific inquiry’s goals and non-propositional representations, idealizations, and 
approximations’ epistemic value. In making our case, we have let interests, social roles, and 
background assumptions (whether true or false) determine inquirers’ perspectives; perspectives, 
in turn, determine which questions are relevant to inquirers; and answers to those questions are 
the locus of fundamental epistemic value. All of inquisitive truth monism’s strengths rely on its 
distinction between relevant and irrelevant questions, and thereby rely on its perspectivism. 
Of course, with perspectives as our prime movers, some natural worries arise. Intuitively, 
perspectives based on epistemically bankrupt “perspectival factors” i.e. interests, social roles, 
and background assumptions, accrue less epistemic value than the scientific perspectives 
described above. Such an objection takes several forms, none of which undercut ITM. 
First, such objections might saddle ITM with the commitment that an answer must cohere 
with a perspective in order to be correct. This is clearly mistaken, for ITM accords no epistemic 
value to false answers. Furthermore, Section 5.2 suggests that ITM ought to accord negative 
epistemic value—epistemic harm—to false answers to relevant questions. Importantly, we do 
not assume any exotic perspectival theory of truth—the T-schema does just fine, thank you! 
Hence, although new age claptrap, lies, and mistaken claims are put forward as answers to 
relevant questions from particular perspectives, those answers lack epistemic value. Similarly, 
we assume that 𝑥 is a means to 𝑦 only if 𝑥 causes or raises the objective probability of 𝑦. 
Since ITM only concerns epistemic value, it need not regard facts about causation and objective 
probability as perspectival. Thus, like truth, instrumental epistemic value is not wholly at the 
mercy of quirky perspectives. As a result, our view accords no epistemic value to false answers 
or objectively unreliable methods, regardless of their centrality to misguided perspectives. 
Alternatively, one may worry that some relevant questions are not worth asking because 
the background assumptions that support their erotetic implications are false. We see no reason 
why false background assumptions from which questions are (erotetically) inferred would raise 
such worries. For instance, Newtonian mechanics was a fruitful theory that, in conjunction with 
its superquestions, e.g. “How do objects move?" erotetically implied many other questions, e.g. 
“Why does the perihelion of Mercury precess?" The latter question’s relevance to Newtonian 
physicists and their successors is incontrovertible. Furthermore, although such questions were 
only correctly answered by abandoning Newtonian mechanics in favor of relativistic mechanics, 
the true answer to this question is clearly epistemically valuable, just as ITM states. Thus, false 
background assumptions per se are no hurdle to relevant questions or epistemic value. 
However, this raises a deeper worry. Among these assumptions are the inquirer’s 
pressuppositions, i.e. those statements a speaker commits herself to when asking a question. In 
erotetic logic, presuppositions are any statement entailed by each answer to a question. For 
instance, if someone asks, “Who drank all the whiskey?", she presupposes that someone drank 
all the whiskey. This presupposition is part of the background assumptions that inform the 
speaker’s perspective, which, in turn determines what questions are relevant for her. 
In the Newtonian example, some background assumptions but no presuppositions were 
false. But a more pressing objection arises when questions’ presuppositions are false, for by ITM’s 
own standards, such questions admit of no true answer. This seems to provide compelling 
grounds for claiming that questions with false presuppositions cannot be relevant. We disagree, 
for there are two kinds of answers, corresponding to whether a question has true or false 
presuppositions.  
Thus far, we have focused on the former case, where direct answers are apt. Roughly put, 
a direct answer is a response that provides neither more nor less information than its question 
demands (Belnap & Steel 1976). For instance, the proposition, that Jim only went to the movies, 
directly answers the question, Did Jim go to the mall or to the movies? However, when questions 
have false presuppositions, true answers will be corrective; not direct. Consider, for instance, a 
case in which two parents are reluctant to vaccinate their children. They ask their pediatrician, 
how the measles, mumps, rubella (MMR) vaccine causes autism in children. The pediatrician 
replies, “I’m sorry, but you’re mistaken. MMR vaccines don’t cause autism.” Here, she does not 
provide a direct answer to the parents’ question, but instead corrects it by denying one of its 
presuppositions. Corrective answers to misguided questions are epistemically valuable, for we 
learn something true that we did not know before. Importantly, this requires no revision to ITM, 
as inquirers should always provide a true answer. It simply specifies that some of these answers 
are direct and others corrective. 
Finally, one may worry that our perspectivism conflates epistemic with non-epistemic 
value. Throughout we have assumed that a truth’s ability to answer a relevant question is of 
epistemic value. However, our perspectival factors are intuitively of non-epistemic value. 
Perhaps, then, a truth’s ability to answer a relevant question is of non-epistemic value. On this 
view, truths that fail to answer relevant questions are epistemically valuable, and any negative 
valence we associate with them is merely because of their lack of non-epistemic (practical, 
aesthetic, etc.) value. 
Notice that by assuming our perspectival factors are of non-epistemic value, this 
objection raises precisely the metaepistemological worries mentioned in Section 3: what theory-
neutral evidence underwrites this intuition? However, even if we bracket this for the sake of 
argument, it does not follow that the ability to answer a relevant question is of non-epistemic 
value. Consider: the fact that 𝑎 has property 𝐹 and that 𝑎 also determines 𝑏 does not entail 
that 𝑏 is 𝐹. For instance, the fact that one’s parents are born in Egypt and that one’s parents 
determine whether or not one was born does not entail that one was born in Egypt. By parity of 
reasoning, even if our perspectival factors are of non-epistemic value and determine whether a 
truth answers a relevant question, it does not follow that a truth’s ability to answer relevant 
questions is of non-epistemic value. 
Thus, all told, ITM’s hearty embrace of perspectivism is defensible. It requires true 
answers to relevant questions to underwrite epistemic value, and requires no exotic 
perspectivism about truth, causation, or probability. Its allowance of false background 
assumptions, including false presuppositions, to yield relevant questions seems to be a feature 
rather than a bug, for such questions can be engines of good inquiry, either because they 
erotetically imply questions with true presuppositions (as in the case of Newtonian mechanics 
and Mercury’s perihelion) or because they lead to corrective answers that reveal where past 
inquiries have gone awry. Finally, we have not covertly changed the subject from epistemic value 
to non-epistemic value. 
   
7 Conclusion 
To conclude, we have argued that inquisitive truth monism—the claim that only true answers to 
relevant questions are of fundamental epistemic value—outperforms the more venerable true-
belief monism. By exhibiting greater fidelity to the Intuition About Inquiry, our view more readily 
accounts for the non-propositional and intersubjective dimensions of scientific representation, 
as well ad idealization and approximation’s epistemic value. Furthermore, since questions’ 
relevance is a function of inquirers’ interests, social roles, and background assumptions, our view 
entails that epistemic value is inherently perspectival. 
Moreover, ITM suggests several exciting lines of development. Most obviously, we would 
like to argue that being a true answer to a relevant question is not just necessary but also 
sufficent for being epistemically valuable. Additionally, we have only compared ITM to TBM. 
However, favorable comparisons with epistemic value pluralists and monists of different 
persuasions would cement ITM’s plausibility. Similarly, our perspectivism invites comparisons 
with other prominent perspectivist positions in the philosophy of science (e.g., Massimi 2018). 
Finally, our view raises questions about how different social arrangements might yield 
different allotments of epistemic value. Are people in certain social roles not entitled to ask or 
answer questions that would be epistemically valuable to them, given their broader interests? 
Might they sometimes be forced to answer questions that, while epistemically valuable to their 
audiences, are morally harmful to them? In this way, we see perspectivism about epistemic value 
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